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The R&D and technology issues of relevance for catching up cannot be understood or conceptualised 
only within the R&D based growth model. With this motivation in mind, we have created a 
composite indicator of innovation capacity and performance of the CEECs, as well as of the EU25, 
which is meaningful from the perspective of countries lagging behind the world technology frontier. 
Three conclusions stem from the Index of Technology Upgrading components which have major 
relevance for policy making. Firstly, we observe a decline in most of the EU25 economies of their 
production capabilities despite, on average, significant improvements in R&D and technology 
capability. This suggests that the EU has serious weaknesses in converting its R&D and technological 
knowledge into production capabilities. Secondly, the Index of Technology Upgrading components 
show improvements in infrastructure and structural changes in most of the EU economies, but an 
overall relative decline in firm capabilities. This shows the limitations of current EU supply oriented 
RDI policies which continue to reinforce the so-called European paradox. Thirdly, increased 
knowledge interaction between 2006 and 2015 has been confined to the German-led Central 
European manufacturing cluster. It seems that the EU RDI policy operates as a substitute for 
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The economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) grew rapidly at the beginning of the 21st 
century until the 2008 global financial crisis, which hit this region very badly, with some 
exceptions (e.g. Poland). Since 2008 growth has resumed, but at much lower levels and the 
process of convergence, that was very strong before 2008, has slowed down substantially. 
This raises issues about the foundations of the pre-2008 growth, as well as the basis of 
future long-term growth.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, pre-2008 growth in CEE could be characterised as finance-
dependent and debt-intensive growth, based on externally financed consumption 
(consumer durables) (in most of the CEECs) (Labaye et al., 2013). The post-2008 challenge is 
how to shift towards growth driven by investments and improvements in productivity.  The 
issue of the basis of growth is quite important, as growth before 2008 was driven by total 
factor productivity, or what is conventionally defined as technological progress, or by 
improvements in efficiency.4 Moreover, labour productivity in CEECs was visibly higher 
before 2008 when compared to the recent period. On average, after 2008 we observe weak 
convergence between CEE and old member states, but this de facto is hiding a pattern of 
polarisation within both old EU15 and CEECs. This suggests that drivers of growth or decline 
have become more diverse within the EU, which as a region has shown declining growth 
dynamics from the early 2000s. 
 
We consider the technology upgrading approach to be relevant for monitoring technology 
upgrading in catching-up economies like CEECs. Gereffi (1999: 51-2) defines it as “a process 
of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to more profitable and/or 
technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive economic niches”. Technology 
upgrading is ‘a shift to higher value-added products and production stages through 
increasing specialization’.  
 
In addition, the technology upgrading framework shows what is behind the lack of 
convergence in technology and innovation capability, and the very weak dynamics, of the 
EU25.5 First, we point to the disjunction between production capability,  and R&D and 
technological capability. We consider this to be a direct effect of EU policy, which favours 
R&D but does relatively less to support production capability and innovation 
implementation. Second, the lack of progress in capabilities in the EU is striking in relation 
to the strong policy drive and improvements regarding S&T and innovation infrastructure 
which suggest that there is a disjunction between RD/innovation and industrial policy in the 
EU. Finally, we show that the intensity of knowledge exchange in the EU25 is unrelated to 
technology upgrading and structural changes, except possibly for the German led Central 
European manufacturing cluster. This suggests that there is a disjunction between FDI/value 
chains policy and national and EU level innovation policies. In summary, we show that the 
monitoring framework, which is conceptually grounded in the literature on technology 
accumulation and catch-up, can generate very relevant policy insights.  
                                                     
4 For evidence see Dobrinsky, R., D. Hesse and R. Traeger (2006) and  Alam et al. (2008). 
5 Our analysis is confined to EU economies with the exception of Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg which are 
economies with either quite specific economic structure or size which would not add qualitatively new insights 
to our analysis.   
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This chapter is organised as follows: first, we explain the differences between the R&D 
driven approach to growth and indexes of technology upgrading conceptualised in a more 
comprehensive setting. Second, we rank EU economies based on our indexes. We present 
the main results of analysis based on indexes of technology upgrading and conduct a 
descriptive analysis of each of the three sub-indexes of technology upgrading which point to 
the three major insights outlined above. We further elaborate on sub-indexes of the main 
indexes to compare macro-regions of CEE with other macro regions of the EU in the north 
and south. We conclude by drawing policy challenges that our analysis has generated. 
2. The narrow (R&D) and broad (ITU) approach to assessing technology 
accumulation in CEE 
 
Metrices of innovation dynamics explicitly or implicitly assume a specific understanding on 
how technology and innovation impacts growth. For example, a conventional policy model 
of technology upgrading assumes that R&D is the major source of growth. This model is the 
basis of the new (endogenous) growth theory (Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1988). Endogenous 
growth models assume that R&D is essentially a probabilistic process with a partly public 
nature, and thus brings technology spillovers which in turn lead to increasing returns to 
scale. A strong focus in innovation metrices on R&D reflects the generally accepted view 
that R&D and innovation are among the main drivers of sustained economic growth.6 
However, the linear logic by which more R&D should lead to more economic growth is a 
somewhat simplified picture of reality. Innovation literature does not actually support such 
a narrow approach to the relationship between innovation and growth. Ultimately, an 
extensive literature on innovation systems has emerged as counterevidence to the 
simplified view that R&D suffices for innovation and growth.  This literature, as well as the 
Schumpeterian growth theory, have shown that R&D does not play an identical role in 
economies at different levels of development. For example, middle-income economies tend 
to grow more on imitation activities, while transition towards the high-income group 
requires a shift towards technology frontier activities, where R&D plays a more important 
role (see Aghion et al., 2013; Aghion et al., 2010). For example, this has been recognised by 
the WEF Global Competiveness Reports which classifies CEECs in terms of driving factors of 
growth as: Efficiency driven (BLG/ROU); in transition (other CEECs), and Innovation-driven 
(SVN, EST).  
 
Our approach is based on the premise that the CEE countries are predominantly technology 
users; however, the pattern of their technology upgrading is different, and thus they require 




                                                     
6 For example, the OECD Growth Study (OECD, 2003) has identified a clear positive linkage between private 
sector R&D intensity and growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for OECD economies. The analysis 
could find no clear-cut relationship between public R&D activities and growth, at least in the short term.  
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2.1 R&D investments and outputs in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
After the ‘transition recession’ during the 1990s, R&D systems in CEE started to recover 
during the first decade of the 21st century. GERD/GDP ratios for EU_CEECs increased from 
below 0.8% until 2006 to 1.16% in 2012 or by 0.4 percentage points of GDP. It is important 
to recognise that on average GERD/GDP did not increase during the period of economic 
growth or before 2008, but only after 2008 when GDP had fallen in many CEECs. This 
increase was very strong in all new member states (NMS) except Croatia, where GERD/GDP 
fell from 0.95% (2002) to 0.75% (2012) of GDP and Romania where the fall was from 0.58% 
(in 2008) to 0.48% (in 2012). The picture after 2012 until 2016 is somewhat  mixed, with 
some countries experiencing a continuing increase, while some others a decrease in their 
GERD/GDP. The clear fact is that, in 2016, all countries showed a considerable decline in 
their GERD /GDP, except Croatia which demonstrated a relatively constant share of GERD in 




Table 1. Gross domestic expenditures on R&D in GDP (GERD/GDP) in CEECs 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Slovenia 1.44 1.25 1.37 1.41 1.53 1.42 1.63 1.82 2.06 2.42 2.57 2.58 2.37 2.2 2 
Czechia 1.1 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.23 1.3 1.24 1.29 1.34 1.56 1.78 1.9 1.97 1.93 1.68 
Estonia 0.72 0.77 0.85 0.92 1.12 1.07 1.26 1.4 1.58 2.31 2.12 1.72 1.45 1.49 1.28 
Hungary 0.98 0.92 0.86 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.98 1.13 1.14 1.19 1.26 1.39 1.35 1.36 1.21 
Poland 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.6 0.66 0.72 0.75 0.88 0.87 0.94 1 0.97 
Croatia 0.95 0.95 1.03 0.86 0.74 0.79 0.88 0.84 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.78 0.84 0.85 
Lithuania 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.8 0.79 0.83 0.78 0.9 0.89 0.95 1.03 1.04 0.85 
Slovakia 0.56 0.56 0.5 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.62 0.66 0.8 0.82 0.88 1.18 0.79 
Bulgaria 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.6 0.63 0.79 0.96 0.78 
Romania 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.55 0.45 0.46 0.5 0.48 0.39 0.38 0.49 0.48 
Latvia 0.41 0.36 0.4 0.53 0.65 0.55 0.58 0.45 0.61 0.7 0.66 0.61 0.69 0.63 0.44 





Table 1 shows that increases of GERD/GDP in Slovenia, Czechia, Estonia and Hungary have 
been quite dramatic or well above the regional average increase of 0.4 percentage points. In 
the first three countries, increases have been around 0.6 percentage points of GDP. In other 
CEE countries these increases ranged between  0.2 and 0.4 percentage points (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Changes in shares of GERD/GDP in percentage points of GDP 2002-2016 
 
Source: Calculations based on Table 1.  
 
Where do changes in the CEE GERD/GDP funding stand in the broader EU context? Figure 2 
shows that changes in CEE are within the EU28 range. The most significant improvements in 
R&D intensity among the EU28 countries have taken place in Austria, followed by Belgium, 
Czechia, Estonia, Slovenia, Portugal and Germany. Other CEE countries are scattered across 
the EU28 spectrum including countries with relative declines in R&D intensity (Croatia with 
Finland and Iceland) or marginal increases (Romania with France and the UK). 
 
Figure 2. Changes in GERD/GDP ratios in percentage points between 2002-2016 and 2008-
2016. 
 



































































































































































Changes in the 2002-2016 period show very strong effects of the 2008 crisis until 2012, with 
a turnaround from 2012 to 2016. More precisely, they show quite a different role of R&D 
which was used either as an anti-cyclical instrument to stimulate demand for technology, or 
as expenditure that shared the impact of austerity policies targeting not directly productive 
expenses.  
 
In this respect, in Austria, Belgium,  Czechia, Slovenia, Germany, Poland, Norway, Bulgaria, 
the Netherlands, Hungary, Slovakia and Greece, R&D expenditures were anti-cyclical  while 
in Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Latvia, Croatia, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg and Sweden, R&D 
was pro-cyclical. 
 
This brief analysis suggests that despite the 2008 crisis, investment in R&D in CEE increased 
until 2012, after which CEE countries, except Poland, Bulgaria and Croatia, have shown 
declining investment in R&D. We presume that the increases in CEE after 2008 are largely 
due to the EU support for R&D and innovation through Structural Funds. Moreover, the 
increase in R&D investments in all CEE countries in this period (2008-2012) outperformed 
the decrease in the 2012-2016 period (except Latvia). In this respect, EU funds play a very 
important counter-cyclical role in preventing the further decline of GDP. 
 
 
2.2 Growth in GNI and GNI per capita in CEE 
 
 
Growth rates were severly hampered throughout the EU after the 2008 crisis (see Figures 3 
and 4). After 2008 CEE grew at slightly higher rates than the EU North and EU South. 
However, the considerably high growth rates achieved by the CEE during the 2002-2016 
period is at odds with the very low level of R&D expenditures in CEE. In particular, the high 
growth rates attained by Romania and Bulgaria cannot be linked to R&D investments. We 
need a perspective which is broader than R&D and which can capture the diversity of 
technology efforts that have been taking place in catching-up economies. R&D is an 
important, but is far from sufficient metric. This simple observation has led us to the 
construction of technology upgrading indexes which capture production capabilities as well 
as innovative capabilities, structural issues underlying the growth process and also global 



















Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
 
Figure 4. GNI per capita growth rate in the EU countries, 2002-16 and 2008-16 (%) (Atlas 
method, current USD). 
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2.3 A comprehensive view on technology and growth in CEE: Indexes of technology 
upgrading 
 
Why do we need an industrial/ technological upgrading perspective? The underlying idea 
behind this approach is that growth is not solely driven by investment in R&D and 
knowledge. Capital accumulation is also important, but it should contain a large learning or 
assimilation of technological knowledge component. Technology upgrading denotes 
substantial changes in a country’s specialisation and knowledge base that increase its 
capacity for value generation (Ernst 1998). This process is the outcome of interactions of ‘a 
set of institutions, incentives and policies that can mobilize huge savings and put them to 
productive use, while at the same time promoting learning efficiency and a broad domestic 
knowledge base’ (Ernst, 1998). Gereffi (1999: 51-2) defines it as  “a process of improving the 
ability of a firm or an economy to move to more profitable and/or technologically 
sophisticated capital and skill-intensive economic niches”. Technology upgrading is ‘a shift 
to higher value-added products and production stages through increasing specialization’. 
However, while being very relevant, this approach is still underdeveloped in terms of 
economic theory. For the time being, there is no theory of industrial/ technological 
upgrading but only a few vague stylisations. In Radosevic and Yoruk (2015, 2016a) we 
review the literature on this area and develop a conceptual approach, which is then applied 
in Radosevic and Yoruk (2016b). 
 
The underlying idea behind the technology upgrading approach is the importance of 
structural differences between low, middle and high-income EU countries. In this respect, 
our approach is in line with the ideas of new structural economics (Lin, 2015) and 
Schumpeterian economics (Lee, 2013; Aghion et al, 2013). Our analysis in this chapter 
should answer an important policy question in the EU context: what is the position of  CEECs 
in the context of Industrial and Technology Upgrading within the wider Europe? 
 
A theoretical and conceptual basis of the new metrics is developed in Radosevic and Yoruk 
(2016). It conceptualizes technology upgrading as a three dimensional process composed of: 
intensity and different types of technology upgrading through various innovation and 
technology activities; broadening of technology upgrading through different forms of 
technology and knowledge diversification; and interaction with the global economy through 
knowledge import, adoption and exchange. All three dimensions have strong grounding in 
the respective literatures on firm level technology upgrading, structural change and growth, 
and integration in the global economy.  
 
The index of technology upgrading is conceptually based on two dimensions, the intensity of 
technology upgrading (Index A) and the breadth or structural features of technology 
upgrading (Index B), which jointly form the index. A third dimension is the index of 
technology and knowledge exchange (Index C) which is a proxy for interaction with the 
global economy; it does not form part of the overall index but operates as separate index 
and helps us to understand how economies go about this third dimension of technology 
upgrading.  Index C interacts with the index of technology upgrading (Indexes A and B) but 
does not directly contribute to it (see Table 2).  The reasons for this are related to the 
varying role – complementary or substitutive - that technology and knowledge exchange 
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can play in relation to domestic technological activities, which are the primary drivers of 
technology upgrading.  
 
The data are classified into two main categories and six components of the technology 
upgrading framework to create an index of technology upgrading (ITU). We generate a 
separate index for the technology and knowledge exchange element (ITKE) (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Indexes of technology upgrading 










































Index 1. Production 
capability 
ISO9001 certificates pmi  
Trademark applications, resident pmi  
Extent of staff training  Q.5.08  1-7 (best)  
Index 2.  Technology 
capability 
Patent applications, resident (to national office) pmi 
Patent applications to USPTO (total=direct and PCT national phase entries) pmi 
Patent applications to EPO (total=direct and PCT national phase entries) pmi  
Industrial design count, resident (by origin) pmi 
Index 3. R&D and 
knowledge intensity  
Business Enterprise Sector R&D expenditures as % of GDP  
Company spending on R&D  Q.12.03  1-7 (best)  
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)  
Researchers in R&D (per million people)  
Technicians in R&D (per million people) 
Science publications: Scientific and technical journal articles  pmi 
Science citations  pmi  
Quality of scientific research institutions  Q.12.02   1-7 (best)  























































Average years of schooling 25+   
Quality of maths and science education Q.5.04    1-7 (best)  
Availability of research and training services  Q.5.07      1-7 (best) 2012-13 
Availability of scientists and engineers  Q.12.06   1-7 (best)  
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people)   
Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP   
Index 5. Structural 
change indicators 
Technology diversification  (changes in patenting structure)  WIPO 
Technology diversification  (changes in patenting structure) EPO 
Buyer sophistication   Q.6.16  1-7 (best) 
Change in demand for innovation (buyer sophistication) 1-7 (best))( % change in Q. 
6.16) 
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Availability of state-of-the-art technologies  Q.9.01  1-7 (best)   
Changes in availability of latest technologies, 1-7 (best)( % change in 9.01) 
Index 6. Firm level 
capabilities 
Number of firms in Forbes firms pmi 






























Index 7. Technology 
and knowledge 
exchange (ITKE) 
Technology balance of payments (receipts) in US$ 
Technology balance of payments (receipts) as % of GDP 
Share of exports in complex industries in total exports (SITCRev3 5 71-79 87 88)   
Technology balance of payments (payments) in US$  
Technology balance of payments (payments) as % of GDP 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
Source: Radosevic and Yoruk (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2018) 
 
 
Radosevic and Yoruk (2015) applied a new metrics of technology upgrading to CEECs on a 
sample of 42 economies ranging from lower middle income to upper high income level 
economies. The index of technology upgrading represents a proxy of potential for 
technology upgrading., A situation where a country has a low income per capita but a high 
index of technology upgrading suggests that this country has good potential for growth 
based on technology upgrading. Meanwhile, a country that currently enjoys high growth 
rates but performs poorly on the index of technology ugrading is likely to face limits to 
further long-term growth. Radosevic and Yoruk (2018) have explored this issue in the 
context of the middle income gap, with specific focus on different income levels. In this 
chapter, we use anidentical approach and estimation methodology with the aim of 
exploring the issues of technology catch-up in the EU28. We follow a standard composite 
indicators methodology for ITU indexes which we summarise in the Appendix. 
 
3. Indexes of technology upgrading  
 
Table 3 illustrates our technology upgrading index measures and the percentage change in 
the main index ITU from 2006 to 2015, as congregated into 5 major group of countries in 
the EU. Leading group is 10 developed economies which we label as ‘North’ group (Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, France, UK, Ireland, Belgium and Austria). There 
is a significant gap between this and the second group which is somewhat less homogenous 
and forms the EU ‘periphery’, consisting of the EU South (Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece) and 
EU East (Baltic states3, Visegrad 5 – Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and South-
East 3 - Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia). These two groups remain identical between 2006 
and 2015, showing that the technology gap has not been closed by any of the periphery 
economies. Moreover, the upper periphery groups remain composed of three South EU 
economies (Italy, Portugal and Spain) plus Estonia and two Visegrad 5 economies (Slovenia 
and Czechia).  
Table 3. Technology catching up and falling behind based on ITU indexes for EU25 and its macro-regions 2015-06. 
 2006 2015  2006-2015   
 
INDEX A INDEX B INDEX C ITU INDEX A INDEX B INDEX C ITU 
% change 
in INDEX A 
% change 
in INDEX B  
% change 
in INDEX C  
% change 
in ITU 
BEL 38.0 61.5 19.0 99.5 45.4 64.9 12.9 110.3 19.7 5.4 -31.8 10.88 
NLD 53.9 65.8 83.7 119.7 55.3 66.0 60.0 121.3 2.6 0.4 -28.4 1.41 
GBR 46.2 64.6 33.3 110.8 45.1 66.0 22.3 111.1 -2.3 2.2 -33.1 0.31 
DEU 70.0 61.1 21.2 131.1 68.6 62.9 22.6 131.5 -2.0 2.9 6.2 0.29 
FRA 48.0 61.5 23.4 109.5 47.0 62.6 22.2 109.6 -2.1 1.9 -4.8 0.12 
IRL 37.2 65.7 48.9 102.9 36.7 65.4 82.3 102.1 -1.4 -0.5 68.2 -0.81 
DNK 60.4 72.8 10.9 133.3 61.9 62.6 11.1 124.6 2.5 -14.0 2.1 -6.55 
AUS 55.3 62.5 12.0 117.8 55.1 54.8 10.6 110.0 -0.2 -12.2 -12.0 -6.60 
FIN 68.9 80.2 17.7 149.2 63.7 69.0 12.3 132.7 -7.6 -14.0 -30.5 -11.06 
SWE 70.1 79.8 20.6 149.9 67.7 65.4 20.9 133.1 -3.4 -18.1 1.1 -11.23 
EU North         0.6 -4.6 -6.3 -2.32 
PRT 24.2 38.0 6.8 62.1 34.4 45.1 6.2 79.4 42.2 18.7 -8.8 27.89 
ITA 37.9 39.1 15.8 77.1 35.1 34.2 12.1 69.3 -7.4 -12.6 -23.0 -10.00 
ESP 38.2 45.4 14.9 83.6 26.3 42.3 12.4 68.6 -31.1 -7.0 -16.6 -18.01 
GRC 16.8 40.6 2.5 57.4 12.4 30.9 2.9 43.3 -26.3 -23.9 17.1 -24.61 
EU South         -5.6 -6.2 -7.8 -6.18 
SVN 35.0 41.4 8.6 76.4 33.7 38.7 11.0 72.4 -3.9 -6.4 27.5 -5.26 
POL 12.2 33.4 9.4 45.6 11.8 31.4 9.9 43.2 -2.9 -6.2 5.4 -5.34 
CZE 36.4 52.3 11.2 88.7 32.0 44.1 13.1 76.1 -12.0 -15.7 17.1 -14.20 
SVK 15.0 44.8 11.2 59.7 15.6 34.7 13.6 50.3 4.3 -22.5 21.0 -15.80 
HUN 24.4 39.8 23.5 64.2 13.2 35.7 15.5 48.8 -45.9 -10.4 -34.1 -23.88 
VIS-5         -12.1 -12.3 7.4 -12.90 
LAT 14.7 29.4 3.2 44.1 17.0 32.3 5.8 49.3 16.1 9.8 84.1 11.89 
LTU 13.7 39.6 5.0 53.3 19.8 39.7 6.2 59.5 44.1 0.4 24.3 11.65 
EST 26.0 47.5 9.1 73.5 31.0 43.9 4.6 74.9 19.1 -7.4 -49.7 1.96 
BLT-3         26.4 0.9 19.5 8.50 
ROU 9.3 33.8 5.2 43.2 10.2 26.5 7.8 36.6 8.9 -21.8 49.2 -15.12 
BGR 13.1 29.6 6.7 42.8 11.6 21.8 4.7 33.4 -11.9 -26.4 -29.3 -21.93 
HRV 12.7 35.4 6.7 48.1 8.5 26.7 6.1 35.2 -33.2 -24.6 -9.8 -26.88 
SEE-3         -12.1 -24.3 3.4 -21.31 
EU Periphery        -0.8 -10.4 5.6 -7.97 
The ITU, as a framework that tries to capture the broader scale and scope of technology 
upgrading, shows that there has been a decline in the index in all macro regions except 
Baltic 3. Moreover, the decline has been the biggest at the EU periphery (-7.97%) compared 
to the EU North (-2.32%). Within the periphery, the decline has been the greatest in SEE-3 (-
21.3%), followed by the Visegrad 5 (-12.9%) and EU South (-6.2%). We can observe an 
opening of the technological capability gap between the EU North and the periphery, with 
the exception of the Baltics. The homogeneity of results based on ITU is quite high as we can 
observe identical trends in all periphery countries (except Portugal) and a polarisation of the 
EU North of those countries which have improved their position based on ITU and those 
which have declined in relative terms.  
 
Index A and Index B components of ITU, as well as Index C, show changes in varied 
directions by macro region and by country. Romania, for instance, a country with the 
highest growth rate, performs well in Index A and Index C. This suggests favourable 
conditions for production capability and knowledge interactions with foreign partners to 
compensate structural changes in the country. In the Baltics region, we can observe a 
positive link between the three upgrading indexes and the growth rates of these countries. 
Although Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have minimal expenditures on R&D, their concerted 
efforts in production capabilities (particularly Lithuania) and knowledge interactions with 
the global environment (in the case of Latvia) seem to have resulted in the high growth 
rates they have achieved. In the sections below, we explore these factors in detail in the 
context of macro-regions and CEE countries.  
4. Analysis of technology upgrading in the context of catching up and growth 
 
In this section, we focus on policy-relevant insights that stem from technology upgrading 
metrics. First, we explore the relative positions of the EU macro-regions on all four indexes 
of technology upgrading.  
 
As expected, the EU periphery trails behind the EU North on both indexes of technology 
upgrading. Regarding the intensity of TU (Index A), the periphery is at 40% of the EU North 
level, and regarding the scope of TU (Index B) it is at 60% of the EU North level (see Figure 
5). This better performance of scope relative to intensity of technology upgrading is a 
common feature of all periphery macro-regions and, as we will go on to discuss, this is due 
to their comparatively better infrastructure as well as structural change. In fact, the poorer 
the macro-region, the better its performance in terms of scope compared to intensity of 
technology upgrading. Regarding the index of technology and knowledge exchange, the 
periphery also trails behind the EU North, with only the Visegrad 5 countries having a much 
more developed technology and knowledge exchange. This is in tune with other results 
which show the existence of a Central European manufacturing cluster linking the EU 















What lies behind the significant gap between the EU North and periphery in intensity, and 
behind the lesser gap in the scope of technology upgrading potential? Figure 6 shows that 
the significantly lower intensity of technology upgrading is strongly driven by big differences 
in technological capabilities (TC). In index A, these are patenting-related activities which in 
periphery countries rank particularly low on a world scale. In TC the gap is one third, in R&D 
it is slightly above 50% while in production capability it is less that 30%. The smaller gap in 
the scope of technology upgrading potential is due to the better position of the periphery in 
terms of infrastructure and structural change, with a gap to the EU North of around 30%. 
However, the biggest gap here is with respect to firm capabilities, which are less than 50% 
those of the EU North (44.9%). 
 
This pattern of technological and firm capabilities being by far the lowest components of 
ITU is present in all EU periphery macro-regions. Also, all macro-regions perform relatively 
better regarding production capabilities, infrastructure and structural change when 
compared to the EU North as a reference. This pattern of relative underperformance in 
technology capabilities and firm capabilities, and overperformance in infrastructure and 
structural change, holds true in relation to GNI pc gaps when compared to the EU North in 
all macro-regions. Therefore, we can take this to be a stable structural feature of the EU 
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Figure 6. Levels of EU25 macro-regions in different components of technology upgrading 







4. Infrastructure: human capital, physical and organisational 
 
A crucial question is what has led to the increased technological gap within the EU25? 
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Note: For the Baltic states, for presentation purposes, we have reduced the change in the technological 
capability component for Lithuania from 324% to 100%, due to the huge increase in the number of patents 





Figure 7 shows the overall improvement in the EU25 regarding R&D and knowledge 
intensity in all macro-regions as well as improvements in terms of technology capability in 
all but the SEE-3 region. For instance, R&D and knowledge intensity and technology 
capability are dimensions of technology-based growth which are well captured by the 
European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) and thus there is a high compatibility of changes in 
this respect between ITU and EIS. Regarding infrastructure, there is no clear trend within 
macro-regions, where two out of six macro-regions (Visegrad 5 and SEE3) have fallen behind 
while in others the infrastructure has improved. However, in all other components, EU 
macro-regions have fallen behind, with the exception of the Baltics in production capability 
and to some extent firm capabilities, and the Visegrad 5 regarding structural change. 
However, the overall trend that emerges from individual components of ITU is improved 
R&D and technology capability and smaller, varied changes in infrastructure, but a major lag 
in firm capabilities and production capabilities, as well as lesser deterioration regarding 
structural change. 
 
These macro-regional trends roughly hold across individual countries. Thus, broad patterns 
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production and firm capabilities can be observed across the majority of the EU25 
economies. In production capability and structural change components 17 economies, and 
in firm capabilities 21 out of 25 economies, have fallen behind; meanwhile in R&D 19 
economies, in infrastructure 16 economies, and in technology capability 12 out of 25 
economies, have improved.  
 
Index C, namely, the Index of technology and knowledge exchange (ITKE) is a separate index 
which does not add cumulatively to the index of technology upgrading. The forms and types 
of technology transfer are quite varied and statistical indicators can only very poorly capture 
the accumulated capabilities which cross national borders. This is less of an issue with 
disembodied knowledge transfer, as depicted through payments and receipts for 
technological knowledge, except for several countries where transfer pricing plays an 
important role as a mechanism of tax evasion (for example, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Hungary within the EU25). Capturing accumulated knowledge through export figures is a 
challenging issue; in future, trade in value-added figures could be a great help in this 
respect, although their availability is still limited.  FDI flows are very remotely related to 
knowledge flows, and supporting evidence  is very inconclusive and context dependent. A 
simple relationship between levels of productivity and our composite index of technology 
and knowledge exchange shows a very weak relationship with EU25. This reflects the 
ambiguity of this index, from which it is difficult to discern whether knowledge inflows 
operate as a substitute or complement to their own technology activities. 
 
Figure 8 below excludes Ireland and the Netherlands, whose inclusion would give a very 
distorted picture. While within indexes of technology upgrading we can observe, on 
average, a strong correlation with productivity levels, in the case of Index C the relationship 
reflects much more the different strategies of involvement in the global economy. The EU 
North is no longer as homogenous as it used to be similar to the EU periphery where the 
Baltics, SEE and EU South (Portugal and Greece) are mixed at the low end of the index. In 
the middle of the regression line, we find both the EU North, EU South (Italy and Spain) and 
all Visegrad 5 economies. The most striking are the very similar Index values of the Visegrad 
5 and North/South EU group. Given their lower levels of productivity, the Visegrad 5 have an 
exceptionally high level of technology and knowledge exchange. We would argue that this 
reflects the Central European Manufacturing cluster which includes the EU manufacturing 
core (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, France, Belgium) and the Visegrad 5 economies which 













Figure 8. Labour productivity (GNI per employee) and Index of technology and knowledge 






It seems that the 2008 crisis did not erode this cluster; instead the cluster has expanded to 
include a few other periphery economies (Figure 9 and 10).  While overall, EU North and EU 
South links with the global economy have declined, this has not been the case to such an 
































































Figure 9. Index C -  Index of technology and knowledge exchange (ITKE) by EU25 macro 






However, the picture of individual countries shows that there have been some interesting 
changes in this period (see Figure 10). The Visegrad 5 intensity of links has actually declined 
due entirely to Hungary. Although all the Visegrad countries (except for Slovenia) 
experienced a decrease in FDI flows, Hungary experienced a dramatic fall in both FDI inflows 
and outflows over the period 2006-2015.  Slovenia, on the other hand, not only continued  
to attract FDI inflows, but also considerably increased its royalty receipts. The intensity of 
links of Romania and Latvia (not shown on graph due to the huge increase but from a very 
low base)  considerably improved over the period. This is due to an increase in the share of 
high-tech exports in their total exports compared to other countries in their respective 
regions, and to transfer pricing in their technology balance of payments. The decrease in 
Estonia’s intensity of links is due to a decrease in FDI inflows and outflows, the sharpest 
among the three Baltic countries. 
 
Within the EU North, German links have increased mainly due to the increase in royalty 
receipts, while links for all other EU North economies have declined. The main factor that 
offsets Belgium, Austria and UK’s position in terms of intensity of links is the significant 
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steepest decline in the share of high-tech exports in total exports. The only exception in this 
respect is Ireland (not shown on the graph due to the huge increase) whose links increased 
by 68% at a level of 82.3 on Index C due to continuing FDI flows, the important role of 
technology balance of payments and transfer pricing, and the increasing share of high-tech 
exports in total exports. Links for the Netherlands declined by 28% but, given the important 
role of technology balance of payments and transfer-pricing, it is difficult to discern financial 
from technological (knowledge) components. Links for the EU South  declined overall 
despite significant increases in Greece, though from very low base.  
 
Overall, with respect to the technology and knowledge exchanges of EU 25, we can observe 
a polarisation between, on the one hand, Germany and the Visegrad economies, which 
increasingly includes Romania, and on the other hand, the rest of the EU, which shows a 
decline in intensity as well as technology and knowledge exchanges.   
 
 
Figure 10.  Index C - Index of technology and knowledge exchange (ITKE) by country in 
2015 and changes in the index between 2006 and 2015 (%). 
 
Note: The figure does not include Ireland, the Netherlands and Latvia whose index in 2015 was 82.3, 60.0 and 
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5. Conclusions and policy issues  
 
In this chapter, we have measured the innovation and technology activities of the EU25 
within the technological upgrading framework. The analytical value of this composite 
indicator is relevant as it focuses metrics on the dimensions of technology upgrading that 
matter for the growth of the broadly defined EU catching-up economies. 
 
We have argued that the RTDI issues of relevance for catching up cannot be understood or 
conceptualised only within the R&D based growth model. The CEE countries are 
predominantly technology users; the pattern of their technology upgrading is different. 
With this motivation in mind, we have created a composite indicator of innovation capacity 
and performance of the CEECs, as well as of the EU25, which is meaningful from the 
perspective of countries lagging behind the world technology frontier. This is an important 
new modification given the strong need to refocus the innovation policies of the CEECs on 
issues of greater relevance for their current technology and industry upgrading. 
 
We have conceptualised technology upgrading as a three-dimensional process, consisting 
of: dimension 1 (the vertical axis) reflecting the intensity of technology upgrading as 
depicted by different types of innovation activities; dimension 2 (the horizontal axis) 
depicting the spread or breadth of technology such as the diversity of technological 
knowledge, types of supporting infrastructure and  structure of firms which carry out 
technology upgrading; and dimension 3 (the diagonal axis) describing knowledge inflows 
into the economy through a variety of forms such as trade, FDI and knowledge exchange.  
 
Three conclusions stem from the Index of Technology Upgrading components which seem 
to have major relevance for policy making. 
 
Firstly, we can observe a decline in most of the EU25 economies of their production 
capabilities despite, on average, significant improvements in R&D and technology capability. 
This is important, as production capability is much more closely related to export and trade 
than R&D and technology capability, particularly in countries lagging behind the technology 
frontier. This suggests that the EU has serious weaknesses in converting its R&D and 
technological knowledge into production capabilities. The Index of technology knowledge 
exchange confirms this by showing a decline in the majority of the EU25, except in 
economies that belong to the Central European manufacturing cluster. 
 
Secondly, the ITU components show improvements in infrastructure and structural changes 
in most of the EU economies, but an overall relative decline in firm capabilities. This is 
probably a reflection of the declining role of large EU firms in the global economy and the 
very weak firm capabilities in the EU periphery. Again, this shows the limitations of current 
EU supply oriented RDI policies which continue to reinforce the so-called European paradox.  
 
Thirdly, increased knowledge interaction between 2006 and 2015 has been confined to the 
German-led Central European manufacturing cluster (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czechia, Poland, 
Hungary and recently, it seems, Romania). This fits well with evidence on trade within the 
EU showing that this area is the one which has increased its relative share in intra-EU trade 
(see WIIW, 2016). Overall, stagnant technology and knowledge exchange for the majority of 
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the EU25, especially the EU South and parts of SEE, suggest that foreign direct investment 
(FDI), subcontracting and global value chain (GVC) policy is not a factor of regional 
advantage. It seems that the EU RDI policy operates as a substitute for technology and 
knowledge exchange rather than as a complement to it. 
 
Within this context, we can observe a polarisation of the CEE into countries which are 
members of the German-led central European cluster and other countries which do not 
benefit from access to European and global value chains. Given their peripheral and semi-
peripheral positions, future growth prospects of the CEE countries are strongly dependent 
not only on their trade, FDI, GVC and other knowledge flows with the EU core, but also on 
their accumulation of production, technology and R&D capabilities. EU membership has 
improved their standing regarding technology and R&D capabilities, as well as regarding 
technology infrastructure. However, their key weakness are weak firm-level capabilities 
which are a key ingredient for converting R&D and technological knowledge into production 
capabilities.  Improvement in R&D and technology capabilities has been unrelated to their 
production and firm capabilities which has de facto opened up new structural gaps in their 
innovation systems.  EU structural funds represent a unique ‘window of opportunity’ to 
close these gaps by promoting the coupling of investments in enterprise R&D and labour 
skills with technology upgrading in design, engineering, management and production 
capabilities. However, there is emerging evidence that this challenge is not yet well 
understood, as demonstrated in inconsistent and ‘zig-zag’ policies (Breznitz and Ornston, 
2018).   
 
 
All in all, our analysis depicts a much more worrying picture regarding the prospects of the 
EU as a convergence machine. From the ITU perspective, we can observe an increased 
technology gap rather than technology convergence. It seems that this increasing 
technology gap is not driven by R&D policies, but by the disconnection between EU R&D 
and other policies such as FDI and GVC policies, between technology and production 
capability related policies and improvements, and ultimately by weak firm organisational 
capabilities. In other words, the EU has reached limits where only R&D based policy can 
operate as a driver of technology convergence It is necessary to re-examine other policy 
areas relating to industrial policy, financial systems and corporate governance. It seems that 
the ultimate weakness for the technology gap lies in non-technological factors such as poor 
corporate governance and weak capital markets which do not favour growth and the 
emergence of large technology-based firms which could commercialize and implement 
acquired R&D and technological knowledge, and function as network organisers.  At the EU 
level, current policies that promote the expansion of R&D via structural funds only serve to 
deepen the R&D-implementation gap. In order to close this gap, these policies should be re-
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Appendix: Methodology for index construction 
 
The individual indicators in Table 2 are used to construct the three technology upgrading 
indexes Index A, Index B and Index C by using composite index methodology. 
 
A typical composite indicator will take the form (Freudenberg, 2003: 7): 
 





I: Composite index, 
Xi: Normalised variable,  
wi: Weight of the Xi,  ∑ 𝑤𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1 and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 
i: 1,…, n. 
 
Equation (2) shows explicitly the normalisation method (Min-Max) used:   












where c indicates country, j and m are indicator and component subscripts and min and max 




Explanations for Composite Index Measures 
1. Technology upgrading intensity index (INDEX A) 
The type and intensity of technology upgrading depends on the production and technology 
capabilities as well as the skills of enterprises and the population, investments and outputs 
in new knowledge creation and generation, and the extent of R&D activities. These are 
essential to technology upgrading, as without them product and process innovations cannot 
be developed.  
 
Index A is composed of three components: Production capability (Index 1), technology 
capability (Index 2) and R&D and knowledge intensity (Index 3). Accordingly:  
 
Index A = Index 1 + Index 2 + Index 3 
 
Production capability (Index 1) aims to capture the rate of activities and output in relation to 
production activity. It is composed of three indicators:  
1. ISO9001 certificates (per million inhabitants), taken from the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO);values between 2006 and 2015 are used in 
the analysis.  
2. Trademark applications, resident (per million inhabitants), taken from World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO);values between 2006 and 2015 are used in 
the analysis.  
3. The extent of staff training, taken from World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report (WEF GCR) Question Q.5.08; values between 2006 and 2015 
are used in the analysis. It is based on the question ‘In your country, to what extent 
do companies invest in training and employee development? [1=not at all; 7=to a 
great extent]). 
 
Technology capability (Index 2) is built on measuring technology generation capabilities, 
mainly in terms of patents. It is composed of four indicators drawn from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and values between 2006 and 2015 are used in 
the analysis:  
 
4. Patent applications, resident, to the national office (per million inhabitants)    
5. Patent applications to USPTO (per million inhabitants) 
6. Patent applications to EPO (per million inhabitants) 
7. Industrial design count, residents (per million inhabitants) 
 
R&D and knowledge and intensity (Index 3) aims to capture the knowledge developed by 
investments in R&D as well as the influence of capabilities embodied in people, i.e. R&D 
personnel, scientists and their publication outputs. It draws on eight indicators. For each 
one, values between 2006 and 2015 are used in the analysis. 
8. Business Enterprise Sector R&D expenditures (% of GDP), taken from Eurostat. 
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9. Research and development expenditure (% of GDP), taken from the World Bank. 
10. Researchers in R&D (per million inhabitants), taken from the World Bank. 
11. Technicians in R&D (per million inhabitants), taken from the World Bank. 
12. Scientific and technical journal articles (per million inhabitants), taken from the 
World Bank 
13. Science citations (per million inhabitants), taken from SJR - Scimago Journal and 
Country Rank (https://www.scimagojr.com/).  
14. The quality of scientific research institutions, taken from the WEFGCR Question 
12.02. It is based on the question: How would you assess the quality of scientific 
research institutions in your country? [1 = very poor; 7 = the best in their field 
internationally] 
15. University - industry collaboration in R&D is taken from WEFGCR Question 12.04. It is 
based on the question: To what extent do business and universities collaborate on 
research and development (R&D) in your country? [1 = do not collaborate at all; 7 = 
collaborate extensively]  
 
2. Technology upgrading breadth index (INDEX B) 
The breadth of technology upgrading lies in structural features and changes in these 
structural features. Structural features are based on human capital, physical capital and 
organisational issues.  
 
Index B is composed of three components: Human capital, physical and organizational 
infrastructure (Index 4), structural change (Index 5) and firm-level capabilities (Index 6). 
Accordingly:  
Index B = Index 4 + Index 5 + Index 6 
 
Human capital, physical and organizational infrastructure (Index 4) is built by measuring the 
influence of capabilities embodied in people throughout the wider population in terms of 
education, the response to skills demand, the extent people exploit available infrastructural 
technologies and the level of fixed investment. Accordingly, it is composed of six manifest 
indicators:  
 
1. Average years of schooling for ages 25+ , taken from the Barro-Lee database. The 
values for each year between 2006 and 2015 are extrapolated using the data 
from 1950 to 2010.  
2. The quality of maths and science educational institutions,taken from WEFGCR 
Question 5.04 for the years 2006-2015. It is based on the question: How would 
you assess the quality of maths and science education in your country’s schools? 
[1 = poor; 7 = excellent – among the best in the world] 
3. The availability of specialized research and training services,taken from WEFGCR 
Question 5.07 for the years 2006-2015. It is based on the question: In your 
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country, to what extent are high-quality, specialized training services available? 
[1 = not available; 7 = widely available] 
4. The availability of scientists and engineers, taken from WEFGCR Question 12.06 
for the year2 2006-2015. It is based on the question: To what extent are 
scientists and engineers available in your country? [1 = not at all; 7 = widely 
available]   
5. Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people), taken from the World 
Bank for the years 2006-2015. 
6. Gross Fixed Capital Formation as % of GDP,taken from the World Bank for the 
years 2006-2015. 
 
Structural change (Index 5) aims to capture, over time, changes in technology capability, 
demand structure and level of available technologies. It comprises six indicators. The first 
two indicators use patent data from WIPO to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. By 
this, we aim to assess the level of diversification by technology field/class in the patenting 
structure of countries. The formula for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculation is given 
below: 






Where si is the share of patents of a country in a specific technology field. The index is 
calculated for each of the countries based on the WIPO technology classification (see 
Appendix E for a list of 35 technology fields). The same method is applied to calculate the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for national patent applications (Indicator 22), applications to 
EPO (Indicator 23) and applications to USPTO (Indicator 24).  
7. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for total national patent applications.  
8. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent applications to EPO 
9. Buyer sophistication, taken from WEFGCR Question 6.16 for the years 2006-
2015. It is based on the question: In your country, how do buyers make 
purchasing decisions? [1 = based solely on the lowest price; 7 = based on a 
sophisticated analysis of performance attributes]     
10. Change in buyer sophistication (annual % change in Q. 6.16 between 2006-2015) 
11. Availability of state-of-the-art technologies, taken from WEFGCR Question 9.01 
for the years 2006-2015. It is based on the question: To what extent are the 
latest technologies available in your country? [1 = not available; 7 = widely 
available] 
12. Change in the availability of the latest technologies (annual % change in Q.9.01 
between 2006-2015) 
 
Firm-level capabilities (Index 6) has two manifest indicators: 
13. Number of firms in Forbes 2000 (per million inhabitants) for the years 2006-
2015. 
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14. Firm-level technology absorption, taken from WEFGCR Question 9.02 for the 
years 2006-2015. It is based on the question: To what extent do businesses in 
your country absorb new technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = aggressively absorb] 
 
 
3. Index of technology and knowledge exchange (ITKE) 
 
This index aims to capture the influence of the global interactions of countries by which 
knowledge flows take place. We assess the impact of such interactions as complementary to 
technology upgrading. The index comprises seven manifest indicators: 
 
1. Technology balance of payments (receipts) in US$, taken from the World Bank for 
the years 2006-2015. 
2. Licencing receipts as % of GDP, taken from the World Bank for the years 2006-2015. 
3. Technology balance of payments (payments) in US$, taken from the World Bank for 
the years 2006-2015. 
4. Licencing payments as % of GDP, taken from the World Bank for the years 2006-
2015. 
5. The share of exports of complex industries in total exports (SITCRev3 5 71-79 87 88). 
Data for this indicator have been extracted from UNComtrade for the years 2006-
2015. We calculated the share of exports in the total exports of each country, 
particularly in SITC Rev.3 sectors: 5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.; 71 to 75 
Machinery (Power generating machines, special industrial machinery, metalworking 
machinery, general industrial machinery, n.e.s, office machines); 76 - 
telecommunications equipment; 78-79 transport equipment (road vehicles, other 
transport equipment); 87-88 electrical and optical (scientific equipment, n..e.s., 
photo apparatus n.e.s., clocks). 
6. Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP), taken from the World Bank for 
the years 2006-2015. 
7. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), taken from the World Bank for the 
years 2006-2015. 
 
 
